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Civil society and democracy: theoretical perspectives
Ideas about civil society have become an increasingly important 
strand in the current discussions within the international development 
community about democracy and good governance. Many of these ideas 
are rooted in western political and philosophical traditions and have 
been imported (not always successfully) into the international develop-
ment discourse. There are, of course, competing conceptualizations of 
civil society within this broader literature, with competing implications 
for state–society relations. These can be broadly divided into liberal and 
radical traditions (Elliot, 2006; Lewis, 2004). As might be expected, it is 
largely conceptualizations drawing on the mainstream liberal traditions 
that have been favoured in the transfer to development contexts. 
Within traditional liberal theory, civil society is seen as the realm of 
voluntary associations, and exists in the space between state, market 
and family. There is a strong normative tendency within this tradition: 
the view that civil society is a ‘good thing’ (Lewis, 2004). The work of 
Tocqueville has been particularly influential within this tradition.2 He 
stressed principles of voluntarism, community spirit and independ-
ent associational life that characterized civil society as an important 
counterbalance to the state’s domination of society. More recently, the 
work of Putnam (1993a, b) promotes the idea of civil society as the 
‘social capital’ of a nation, generating horizontal relationships of trust 
and reciprocity and capable of being harnessed for collective action in 
the interests of the wider society. He contrasts this with the vertical 
patron–client relationships that characterize kin-based communities 
and that promote a bounded form of morality, the privileging of narrow 
self-interest over the collective good. 
Such ideas have underpinned a great deal of the more positive 
discussions about civil society that are a feature of the international 
development discourse. However, a further strand was added to these 
discussions, with the rise in the 1980s of the neoliberal agenda within 
the international donor community. Its critique of the rent-seeking 
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state and its privileging of private initiative led to public sector re-
forms  designed to reduce the state’s role in both the economy and 
service  delivery and to promote market forces. Where markets failed to 
emerge or were characterized by imperfections, civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs), particularly development non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), were seen as the next best alternative. 
Civil society thus occupies two, somewhat different, roles in the inter-
national development agenda. CSOs have become an integral part of the 
donor-led ‘good governance’ agenda, based on assumptions about the 
‘elective affinity’ between civil society and democracy (Betteille, 2000). 
Within the (frequently justified) neoliberal critique of bloated, ineffi-
cient and corrupt states, a proliferation of organized, voluntary and 
autonomous associations is viewed as critical to the task of building 
and consolidating the democratic sphere. In addition, it has become 
an integral part of the privatization agenda, representing a preferred 
alternative to state provision wherever the markets are either lacking 
or failing. 
There is an alternative radical tradition in the literature on civil 
 society – one that has been heavily influenced by the work of the Italian 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci and others. This tradition depicts civil 
society as a sphere comprising organizations that are separate from (but 
enmeshed with) the power structures of the state and market, and in 
which competing ideas about state and society struggle with one another 
(Davis and McGregor, 2000; Lewis, 2004). There is nothing inherently 
democratic about these organizations. Instead they are characterized by 
varying degrees of co-optation into existing power structures, and hence 
act in varying degrees to challenge or uphold the existing social order. 
The question that these debates raise, therefore, is whether the  nature 
of CSOs matters to their outcomes. Putnam (1993a, b), for instance, 
recognized that some associations are more productive of the values 
that support good government than are others; however, as Elliot (2006) 
points out, this was a minor caveat to his major theme of celebrating 
the positive contribution CSOs make to democracy, thanks to the social 
capital they produce: according to Putnam, such contributions could 
arise from purely social groups or sports clubs, as well as from associa-
tions that set out to promote democratic values. Similarly, Rosenblum 
(1994) argues that what prepare citizens for democracy are not the values 
held by associations, but the plurality of associations with permeable 
boundaries, as well as the ability of people to opt out of them. 
Others, however, have argued that the vision and values of organ-
izations matter to their achievements on the democratic front. Those 
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influenced by the work of Freire (1972) have stressed the need to build 
the organizational capacity of the poor and dispossessed, in order to 
enable them to mobilize politically for their rights as citizens. More 
recent arguments suggest that promoting the role of NGOs in service 
provision (as an alternative to the state) risks undermining their capacity 
to deliver on the governance front. On the one hand, unlike govern-
ments, NGOs are not authorities that can legitimately be expected to 
uphold the rights of poor people (Moore and Putzel, 1999). On the other 
hand, their service delivery function dilutes their capacity to maintain 
a watchdog function and to hold governments accountable. However, 
such arguments are valid only in certain contexts. In the context of 
Bangladesh, the alternative to NGOs is not a reasonably responsive and 
well-functioning state, but a highly corrupt and predatory one. 
The NGO sector in Bangladesh
The aim of this chapter is to explore some of these questions from the 
perspective of the NGO sector in Bangladesh. Recent estimates suggest 
that around 22,000 NGOs are currently operating in the country. Most 
are extremely small and local in their activities. Our concern is with 
registered development NGOs: although there are only around 2,000 of 
these, they constitute a prominent and very visible strand of civil society 
in Bangladesh, and one that is far more active in the everyday lives of 
the country’s poorer citizens than other strands of civil society. It has 
been estimated that they operate in more than 78 per cent of villages 
in what is still a largely rural society, and directly benefit around 35 per 
cent of the total population. 
The NGO sector has undergone substantial change since the coun-
try’s independence from Pakistan in 1971. Many NGOs were founded in 
the difficult years following the war of independence, and they adopted 
a radical approach to social change. They were influenced by the struc-
tural analysis of socio-economic inequality that is exemplified in some 
classic studies from that period (BRAC, 1983; Arens and van Beurden, 
1977; Village Study Group, 1975). They were also inspired by the work of 
Freire (1972), with its emphasis on the ‘conscientization’, organization 
and mobilization of poor and dispossessed groups. Most relied on funds 
from international NGOs and foundations that shared their vision of 
social justice: Oxfam, the Ford Foundation, Canadian University Service 
Overseas, War on Want, Swallows, Action Aid and Diakonia.
By the end of the decade, NGOs had begun to undergo a series of 
changes. The onset of military rule in 1976 had led to a gradual nar-
rowing of the civil society space for radical politics. NGOs that received 
